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Abstract
The port of Koper (It. Capodistria) in the Slovenian part of the Istrian peninsula 
was built in the second half of the 1950s as a socialist modernization project. In 
1970, it witnessed the only violently escalating dockers’ unrest in its socialist history. 
Using the personal archive of Danilo Petrinja, the port’s second director, which has 
been pre-served in the Regional Archive of Koper, the author takes a micro-historical 
approach to this incident, and views it at the historical moment in Yugoslavia 
between the student protests of 1968 and the ‘Croatian spring’ of 1971. She adds a 
perspective on the interconnectedness of the early 1970s and the late 1980s, when 
social unrest was an integral part of Yugoslavia’s demise. The episode of public 
violence in the Yugoslav border city of Koper offers proof of the multi-layered 
nature of explanatory tropes: the border perspective from Koper is interwoven with 
the perspective of Yugoslavia as a whole, and a comparison with workers’ violence in 
neighbouring Trieste during the same years adds yet another twist to a reassessment 
of the applicability of the Cold War framework to an examination of labour relations 
and violence.
Keywords
Dockyard workers, general strike, Koper/Capodistria, Italo-Yugoslav border region, 
public violence, self-management, Trieste
Introduction
Violence obviously played a very specific role in the recent history of Yugoslavia and its 
successor states. The wars accompanying the dissolution of the state have
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largely shaped the parameters of research during the last two decades.1 After the end of 
state socialism and Yugoslavia, any topic other than the exhausted one of the ideologized 
‘heroes of (industrial) labour’ seemed desirable. As a result, the history of industrial 
workers has been over-studied from a certain perspective and thoroughly neglected 
from many others. The oversaturation of ideologized narra-tives consigned the history 
of socialist Yugoslavia’s workers to oblivion rather than stimulating the sort of rewriting 
of history that has occurred in other fields.2 This approach has fostered a focus on the 
new or renewed nation-state frameworks of the post-socialist states in a process that has 
valued studies in this framework above al others.3
From the recent global perspectives that have characterized labour history, European 
state socialist experiences have remained on the empirical margins, as a conceptual 
outpost. Whilst colonial and post-colonial experiences have received considerable 
atention, more often than not the state socialist economies have been disregarded.4 Past 
events have tended to be approached from the premise that ‘a history of the world of 
labour always is part of a transnational history of capital-ism’.5 With respect to 
Yugoslavia, labour unrest and strikes have been studied selectively and mostly with a 
focus on the very last phase of state socialism. The clear aim has been to contribute to an 
explanation of the horrific aftermath and, to that end, to convey a sense of the uter 
gravity of the situation in the second half of the 1980s, with its perceived incongruities in 
the socialist system, economic crisis and nationalist confrontations. In the mid-1980s, 
there was ‘a qualitative increase in the number, duration and scope of strikes right across 
the country’.6 Social unrest and strikes were triggered by an ever-sharper decrease in the 
standard of living and, eventualy, by a wage freeze and other austerity measures in May 
1988. The level of mobilization of industrial workers in Yugoslavia is said to have 
matched that of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in terms of violence and to have 
exceeded the numbers mobilized in other East European states, the social diversity of the 
participants and the temporal and geographical reach of such mobilization.7
Recently, Yugoslav studies have turned their atention to the 1960s and 1970s and 
have focused on the emblematic images of Yugoslavs entertaining themselves on 
shopping trips to Trieste and of tourists basking on the Croatian coast,8 on 
consumerism, Americanization and the perceived ‘golden decade’ of the 1960s,9 on 
student unrest in 196810 and on the ‘Croatian spring’ of 1971.11 
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The absence of workers 
from this historiographic narrative, especialy with regard to the peak protest years 
between 1968 and 1971, requires further scrutiny. This study seeks to fil in the existing 
gaps in knowledge, complementing this new sociocultural history and adding a critical 
eye from a different perspective on the orchestration of consent in socialist Yugoslavia.
An examination of the outburst of public violence among workers during the years 
between 1968 and 1971 seems especialy pertinent because, as noted previ-ously, the 
mid-1980s in Yugoslavia displayed an amplified version of many features of the 
mid-1960s: economic stagnation, mass unemployment, rising inflation and
labour unrest.12 Research concerning violence in socialist Yugoslavia has tended to focus 
on ethnonationally motivated violence, in Kosovo and in Croatia, above all. 
Contemporary observers perceived such violence as potentially far more dangerous to 
the system than other types, and there was a belief, widespread and imposed from above, 
that social conflicts could be reined in by systemic adjustments.13 Such adjustments were 
a perpetual feature of Yugoslav self-management, ‘a unique eco-nomic and societal 
experiment’, accompanied by a surprisingly open debate on the failures involved in 
putting the experiment into practice.14
Yugoslavia’s North-Western Border
Yugoslavia’s north-western border region was not a theatre of war in the 1990s, but it 
had been an emblematic location during the Cold War.15 Whilst the shopping habits of 
Yugoslavs travelling to Trieste reflected the use of one of the most open Cold War 
borders,16 the Italo-Yugoslav border represented unresolved state-build-ing issues until 
the mid-1970s, and it fostered both local identity and mutual exclu-siveness. Only in 
November 1975 did the Treaty of Osimo provide a legal determination of the post-war 
border that had been established as a de facto boundary by the London Memorandum in 
1954. The Treaty of Osimo was ratified in the context of the Helsinki Accords of August 
1975, signed by both Italy and Yugoslavia.17 This major diplomatic agreement was 
generally perceived as a ‘watershed’ in the Cold War, and it turned out to mark the end 
of the socioeco-nomic boom.18 As will be shown, questions about the political ideology 
and the social role of the workforce in the post-war border region require explanation 
on many levels.
There was a long tradition of political violence in the multi-ethnic border region. 
When the region belonged to fascist Italy during the interwar period, there were 
considerable communist underground activities by the workforce in the cities of Trieste, 
Monfalcone and Rijeka, as well as the smaller urban centres of the region, like Rovinj (It. 
Rovigno), Labin (It. Albona), Piran (It. Pirano), and Koper, with no industrial port at 
the time.19 After 1945, the workers looked back not only on the catastrophe of the 
Second World War, but also on the preceding 20 years of violent Fascist repression. 
When the labour milieu was re-established, these memories remained, yet the 
community began anew with a significant number of unqualified and previously non-
industrial workers.20 The labour community had been transformed by war casualties 
and massive migratory waves that deprived Istria of the majority of its Italian 
inhabitants, and of most of the region’s skilled and industrial workers.21 At this Cold 
War border, the national-ideological con-frontation was deeply interwoven with the 
political-ideological one, even among the region’s Italian and Yugoslav (Slovene and 
Croatian) Communists: After the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, the Italian Communist Party 
had remained Stalinist and thus had entered into conflict with those Communists who 
now renounced Stalin and adhered to Titoism. Paradoxically, the ensuing quests for 
political loyalty were, in part, ethnically motivated.22
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The present study is informed by a reshaping of the classical concepts of labour 
history to accommodate more comprehensive questions regarding labour.23 Common 
obstacles to research regarding popular protest, especially in authoritar-ian societies, 
include the difficulty of gathering information about specific episodes. It is here that an 
examination of factory archives provides interesting insights. Danilo Petrinja (1922–
2002), a founding father of the port of Koper, left a personal archive that is preserved in 
the Regional Archive of Koper (Pokrajinski Arhiv Koper). Petrinja became the port’s 
second director in 1959. His term in office ended in April 1970, with the huge and 
violently escalating strike that is the focus of attention here. As I will show, attempts to 
keep conflict in check and to enforce outward harmony, social peace, among the various 
agents of the self-management system were not only part of the complex relationships 
between work-ers and managers, but also an expression of the entangled relationships 
among the elite functionaries, as suggested by the continual restructuring of self-
manage-ment.24 The question of the origin of violence, apart from nationally motivated 
unrest – the question of when social conflict turned violent, and why – can promote a 
change of perspective that keeps the final dissolution of Yugoslavia in sight. The north-
western border of the country lends itself particularly to such a case study, precisely 
because the region adjoined the West, was relatively prosperous within Yugoslavia, and 
was indicative in its ideological and national complexities.
The 1970 Strike in the Port of Koper
The founding and development of the port of Koper was a genuinely socialist 
endeavour. After it became clear that Trieste would not become a part of Yugoslavia/
Slovenia, and especially after the London Memorandum of 1954 had established a de 
facto boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, the project of con-structing a new port on 
the Slovenian coast gained momentum. The port was formally created in December 
1958. Its symbolic meaning was at least threefold: it was intended as a competitive 
endeavour to vie with the ‘lost’ Trieste; it was Slovenia’s first international industrial 
port (and remains its only one); and it was a symbol of the growth of socialist 
industrialization, intended to complement the nearby port of Rijeka in Croatia.25
The Iron Curtain that Churchill in 1946 had seen falling ‘from Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic’ was often ignored by the local residents. In June 
1969, the port’s managers began their account of the enterprise’s future economic 
plan with the words: ‘Together with Rijeka and Trieste, Koper represents the 
Northern Adriatic basin of ports, towards which gravitates the larger part of 
Central Europe’.26 Whilst this clearly expressed the wish to place the port of 
Koper, in the tenth year of its existence, in the framework of the larger and trad-
itional ports of the north-eastern Adriatic region, the disregard of the systemic 
divide is striking.27
Scarcely one year later, in March 1970, Koper experienced the biggest workers’ 
protest in its socialist history. The protest was the only one to affect all entities of
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the port and to develop into an aggressive demonstration. Workers not only rioted at 
their workplace, but for the first time left the port and occupied the public space of the 
city’s centre. On the main square, a further escalation of violence was pre-vented at the 
last moment by a direct intervention by the director, Petrinja.
What was the reason for the acute dissatisfaction? In the first decade of its existence, 
the port had grown impressively. Yet, neither infrastructure nor wages had kept pace. As 
a result, there was a continuously high turnover of the work-force. Insufficient 
equipment and lack of personnel meant that sometimes more than thirty ships were 
lined up waiting to be unloaded. Most importantly, the 32-kilometre-long railway 
connection between Koper and Presˇ nica, 460 metres above sea level, between the sea 
and the Karst plateau and connecting the port to the century-old Vienna–Trieste 
railway, the Austrian-built Su¨dbahn, was financed by direct investment by the 
enterprise, as neither Ljubljana nor the federal authorities in Belgrade had consented to 
subsidize the railway connection so vital to the fur-ther development of the port. The 
railway line was opened in 1967, but its electri-fication was not completed until 1976. 
The lack of both federal and republican support is conspicuous, and it mirrors the 
combined effect of Yugoslav distributive policies regarding the more prosperous north-
western republics and the southern ones, Belgrade’s (as well as Ljubljana’s) hesitant and 
ambiguous economic policy regarding Yugoslavia’s Adriatic coastline, as well as the 
prevailing insecurity result-ing from the merely de facto border settlement.28
Overall, the port was the first large infrastructure project on the Slovenian coast after 
the provisional settling of the border in 1954. It was successful: at the begin-ning of 
1970, in terms of commodities flow, Koper had become the second-largest port in 
Yugoslavia after Rijeka and the first project completed without the financial help of the 
federal authorities in Belgrade. In the beginning, it had operated with-out an adequate 
railway link to the hinterland, without any tradition of dock work, and with huge 
competition from the traditional ports of the region in both Trieste and Rijeka. In 1970, 
it had progressed to being the only Yugoslav port apart from Split to operate without a 
loss and at the same time to manage considerable expansion.29
The huge investments, made exclusively with the company’s revenues, together with 
housing and catering facilities and hygienic conditions on the shop floor, failed to keep 
pace with the increase in the workforce. This failure led to the violent eruption of social 
protest in March 1970. The workers perceived the investment policy as being carried out 
largely at the expense of their wages, which had been reduced in the previous years, after 
having been effectively linked to their product-ivity during the first years of the port’s 
speedy development, despite different ideo-logical provisions.30
The final impetus for the strike was a decision made by the workers’ council, 
implementing a demand from the management, to introduce stricter shop floor 
regulations. The new measures eliminated pay for working hours not spent work-ing 
(idle time), introduced piecework, limited the amount of overtime and required 
presentation of a medical certificate in case of illness. The individual work units
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organized ‘forced meetings’ (izsiljeni sestanki), the most intense of which took place
in the mechanization unit. It seems that the leading engineer of that unit did little to
explain the situation to the workers or to attenuate the tension. It was here that the
strike broke out.31
In an interview in March 2000, Danilo Petrinja firmly linked the beginning of
social tensions to the influx of workers from more remote regions of Yugoslavia,
beyond Koper’s immediate hinterland, during the second half of the 1960s. He
spoke of ‘new mentalities’ and ‘bad workers’ (slabi delavci) that entered the work-
force, whilst a large number of the original workers left. Supervisory personnel
continued to be scarce.32 To Petrinja’s mind, the interest in the industrial growth
that the port had brought to the region was firmly rooted locally. The initial small
group of skilled workers and engineers had been supported by foremen who led
workers who came from ‘Istria, the Brkini mountains and the Karst’ and believed
in the significance of the port for the development of Istria.33 The liberalizing
reforms of 1965 produced an increase of courage in the workers. For Petrinja,
these were ‘individual groups of workers’ (posamezne skupine delavcev) whose
requests damaged the overall project, and who were aggressive: ‘Pay us [more],
or else we don’t work’ (plačajte, drugače ne delamo).34 The initial idealism and
willingness to sacrifice, as he saw it, had vanished. It seems as if the general regu-
lations that the reforms of 1965 had brought in favour of the workers’ effective self-
management potential had contributed to the decline in labour relations in Koper,
where at the very same moment investments were largely concentrated on con-
struction of the railway connection to the hinterland, and wages were diminishing
as a result.
Petrinja’s memory corresponds to his discursive framing of the strike
when it occurred. In a report written immediately after the strike, in July 1970,
on the ‘strained economic problems and relations’ in the port, he insistently
praised workers who had been unusually committed. The port, he repeated
over and over, had been built exclusively by the initiative of such workers, with little
support from banks and state institutions. He admitted, however, that the major-
ity of workers had been affected by the harsh working conditions. Turnover
among the workforce had always been high.35 In 1969, 703 new workers were
hired, many of whom had arrived from other parts of Yugoslavia, whilst
490 had left the company. There was a rising shortage of domestic labour.
Although self-management clearly was designed to bind workers to their work-
place, obviously little feeling of belonging, of loyalty towards the enterprise, had
developed.36
In the interview, Petrinja recalled both the international dimensions of the port’s
beginnings and communication across the immediate border, which he said had
taken place through illegal channels. For example, he recalled, about 500 (sic)
villages in the port’s catchment area were electrified as a result of profits from
illegal exports to, and re-imports from, Italy. Similarly, water pipes in the Karst
were illegally built across the state border. It would have been ten times as costly to
build them legally.37
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Petrinja blamed both the Yugoslav central government in Belgrade and the
political nomenklatura in Slovenia for their lack of interest in making the port
an economic success, and he praised the zeal of the workers in trying to accomplish
their task despite such circumstances. He mentioned having been the object of
investigation several times; his recollection was that he had accomplished moder-
nizing initiatives in spite of the authorities, rather than in pursuit of their declared
ideological goals.38 Yet, he had led a model Titoist life. Scarcely three months
before the strike, he received the Boris Kraigher Award, bestowed on successful
company directors, in acknowledgement of his sustained commitment to develop-
ment of the region. At the award ceremony, mention was made of his having joined
the national liberation movement at the age of 21 and his offices after the war as
secretary and head of several committees appointed by the Yugoslav administra-
tion of Zone B and as the director of the Koper waterworks.39
The year 1969 had seen a massive influx of new workers from other parts of
Yugoslavia. As the proceedings of the management meetings reveal, Petrinja
thought this was a rather useless development,
as we now practically have three workshops at our disposal and a group of layabouts
(lenuhov) who refuse to take on any work in a serious way. The third problem, how-
ever, is the poor organization of work, the lack of discipline and damages that come
about through carelessness as well as theft.40
Contradicting several of his co-managers, he insisted that any measures to mend
the situation would have to be carried out with due severity.41 This discussion
about the situation on the shop floor, the perceived lack of discipline and poor
organization of labour had dominated the managerial meetings for weeks. Petrinja
had insisted that beyond the ‘objective reasons’ for the difficulties – the investment
in the railway link to the hinterland, the inefficiency of forwarding agents, delays in
building additional infrastructure capacity – there were ‘too many subjective weak-
nesses and organizational shortcomings’.42 The huge rate at which workers joined
and left the workforce, caused by the far-too-low wages, was a key issue. The
workforce lacked both qualifications and information about the workflow and
the specific needs of the dock. As it seems, even the foremen in the cargo-loading
section, the ‘carriers of organizational tasks’ (nosilci organizacije), had largely
departed for better-paid positions. No measures had taken effect to improve the
quality of the work performed and discipline, and it seemed that the only solution
was to get rid of incompetent employees. In addition, any substantial improvement
was thought to be dependent on a wage level that was above average with respect
to similar positions in Slovenia. And this goal could be achieved only by reducing
the size of the workforce and increasing individual responsibility. Planned dismis-
sals were to be carried out by May 1970, and the managers discussed how they
could get the workers’ council (delavski svet) to support their objectives.43 When
the council announced new regulations, including dismissals, the workers went on
strike.44
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Apart from the habitual quests for higher wages and relaxation of the new
regulations concerning illness, idle time and piecework, however, the strike was a
moment of fierce conflict between the acting director and several members of the
management. As already suggested, the latter helped to incite the strike or at least
skilfully fomented it. Their aim was Petrinja’s dismissal.
The reforms of 1965 had laid the groundwork for a more liberally oriented,
younger generation of managers to arise. The constitutional amendment of
December 1968 had strengthened the powers of the workers’ councils. However,
because the Koper port was founded only in 1958, the struggle for power at the end
of the 1960s cannot be interpreted simply as the result of policies aimed at creating
a better-educated economic elite. In 1970, Petrinja was 48 years old. His dismissal
took place in a general atmosphere of intense debate concerning checks and bal-
ances between the various levels of self-management functionaries, who sought to
replace the paternalistic, if not authoritarian, early post-war directors. The debate
focused on how conflicts were to be resolved at all levels of the enterprise. During
the period after the Koper strike, 1971–1973, as part of the ‘cleansing’ efforts after
the Croatian crisis, Slovenia’s directors were subject to an ‘open hunt’ (odprt lov) if
they were suspected of not toeing the Party line. This political-ideological, as well
as intergenerational, struggle was an essential component of the process that led to
the changes of 1974–1976, when another fragmentizing rearrangement of person-
nel, another step in the process of technocratization and bureaucratization, was
reached.45
In Koper, at the moment of the strike, the company files report that the director,
Petrinja, was ill. Evidently he had overexerted himself. Engineer Egon Prinčič, who
substituted for him, let things escalate rather than undertaking a mediating role. He
joined the striking mass of workers and marched at its head, carrying the Yugoslav
flag, towards the city’s central square. There, the strike culminated in noisy, violent
agitation, prompting the municipal party secretary to take the initiative to try to
prevent further violence. He went to fetch Petrinja and convinced him to come and
talk to the workers, despite his illness. Petrinja succeeded in persuading the dockers
to return to the port. Here, however, they continued to riot and prevent any
dialogue.46
The next day, the workers’ council gave in and agreed to the workers’
demands. It reintroduced pay for all idle time and granted the desired wage
increases. The issue was raised of the enterprise’s share in subsidizing employees’
lunches. In the middle of these accommodations, the council received Petrinja’s
written resignation. Refusing to accept it, the council members reminded the dir-
ector of his obligation to continue to manage the port even under such
circumstances.47
The president of the Executive Committee of the Slovene Government, Stane
Kavčič, supported the workers’ council in its wish to retain Petrinja. Kavčič pro-
mised to intensify government support for the port’s development.48 Petrinja’s
challenger, Prinčič, however, continued to work towards the director’s dismissal
and was effectively supported in this effort by a group of younger engineers.
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The company files speak of ‘conspiracy’. A few weeks after the end of the strike, the
workers’ council finally consented and installed Prinčič as the new director, most
probably with both Kavčič’s and Petrinja’s approval, the latter having apparently
accepted the inevitable.49
The municipal party committee empowered a commission to investigate the
reasons for the strike. As a result, the workers’ council was reproached for
having made decisions without consulting those who had the necessary know-
how, meaning the management. Given that the workers’ council had introduced
the regulatory measures upon the request of the managing committee, of which the
‘conspiring’ engineers were a part, it remains difficult to distinguish between lip-
service statements and the real power struggle.50 No evidence is available that
Petrinja had prompted the workers’ council to act exclusively on his behalf, thereby
disregarding other personnel. However, the handling of the strike, including the
concession to all the demands, corresponded to the way strikes and work stoppages
were habitually dealt with in Yugoslavia, and may well have concealed settlements
behind the scenes. In any case, a concerted and conscious initiative to control the
public space and to contain conflict by implementing self-management regulations
emerged.
The overall atmosphere in Koper remained tense. The former director and the
new one publicly blamed each other for the strike and more generally for the port’s
difficult socioeconomic situation. In a private letter to Prinčič some months after
the new director had taken office, Petrinja threatened him with dire consequences
should the public mud-slinging continue. In his letter, he repeated the accusation
that concerted action had been directed against him. The workers, he maintained,
had been incited to strike because the decision of the workers’ council regarding the
labour regulation measures was combined with a piece of false information about
the economic situation of the port. Those who spread this information took advan-
tage of the acting director’s absence at that moment, due to his illness. He, Petrinja,
wished to make it very clear that his personal life was wrapped up in the construc-
tion of the port, and that he would insist that the port be further developed ‘for the
interest of the wider societal community, and not for the interest of several over-
bearing and ambitious individuals!’51
With Petrinja’s dismissal and the acceptance of the workers’ demands, the exist-
ing problems were in fact perpetuated. The port became part of Yugoslavia’s gen-
eral technocratic and procedural approach to self-managed labour relations and
regulations, and, as such, deeply entangled in the increasing difficulties of a society
that ‘lived through a permanent, almost manic change of the institutional order of
the system, driven by the ideological imperative of the idea of a self-managed
society’.52 By the time the organizational structure of enterprises was adapted
once again in 1974, in the framework of Yugoslavia’s constitutional changes, the
Koper port had begun to suffer from debt, excessive increases in labour costs, a
continuing high rate of turnover in the workforce and organizational instability.53
Until the 1970 strike, the new port had functioned in a somewhat anti-
cyclical manner with respect to the general socioeconomic direction of the
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self-management system. This situation changed by the second half of the 1970s.
Before the breakup of Yugoslavia, no other major strike occurred in the port, with
the exception of a work stoppage in 1976 when the request to reintroduce beer
during lunch in the company cafeteria was granted.54 When Bruno Korelič took
office in 1977, installed, as were his predecessors, by the Slovene government in
order to restructure the port’s management strategies, the port embarked on a
more stable course of development that brought rising amounts of transit freight
throughout the 1980s. At that time, the range of capacities, for example, the com-
pletion of the bulk cargo terminal and grain silo and the introduction of the ship-
ment of automobiles, was extended to those that characterize the port today.
Korelič held the positions of director or vice-director between 1977 and 2005,
with two interruptions to serve as the mayor of Koper (1982–1984) and as the
director of the bureau of commercial relations of Yugoslavia’s chamber of com-
merce in Trieste (1990–1992). Given that this period includes the last years of
Yugoslavia and the post-socialist transition, Korelič’s significance in the history
of the port’s performance matches that of Petrinja.55
Beyond the Yugoslav Border: Workers’ Unrest in Trieste
A freight forwarder and commercial agent employed in the port of Koper from
1963 until his retirement in the 1980s, notes, when recalling the strike of 1970, that
‘the workers in Koper learned about the culture of striking from Italy’, that they
‘saw what the workers in Trieste had obtained in terms of wage increase with their
strikes’. He describes a political apprenticeship that is at least peculiar, with the
Western labourer teaching the socialist one to fight for his rights, violently, if
necessary.56 If one considers that the Italian strikes had to have a decidedly
public character in order to be noticed by the dockers in Koper, then one perceives
not only the open character of this Cold War border region but also the way in
which social discontent could bridge the systemic divide by ‘going public’.57
At the time, Italy had the largest communist party in Western Europe, and in the
mid-1970s the Italian Communist Party (PCI) came close to becoming part of the
Italian government.58 In addition, it should not be forgotten that in the 1970s and
early 1980s, the political elites of several Western European countries, including
Italy, viewed public political violence as a serious threat to state stability.59 In
examining the attempts of the functionaries in Koper to deal with or to instrumen-
talize the workers’ discontent, it is useful to consider how violence was present, as a
threat and as an act, in the Italian workers’ milieu in the border region at the same
time period but in a different socio-political system.
It is no surprise that violence in the Italian workers’ milieu is much easier to
detect than in the Yugoslav one. Yet, just as in Yugoslavia socially motivated
strikes and protests were interpreted as showing a need either for suppression or
for increased participatory rights in the self-managed economy, the political debate
in Italy was polarized between those who conceived protest as a threat and those
who viewed it as an essential part of a democratic society.60
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Three instances of public riots during workers’ protests at the San Marco ship-
yard in Trieste seem significant for the Koper strike of March 1970, and these
occurred in the autumn of 1966, in June 1968, and in the autumn of 1969. The
last of these is known in Italian collective memory as the ‘hot autumn of 1969’,
because a huge wave of violent workers’ protests swept the whole of northern Italy
at the time. As a result, in 1970 the government in Rome issued a Workers’ Statute
(Statuto dei Lavoratori), which granted the hitherto heavily dependent workers a
large degree of self-management and an almost unlimited right to strike. Dismissals
from work became virtually impossible. In 1975, the Scala mobile, the automatic
adaptation of salaries to the cost of living, was introduced.61
In August 1966, workers in Trieste’s San Marco shipyard called a general strike.
The background for the protests was the imminent closure of the shipyard. When
in October of that year the Italian Interministry Committee for Economic Planning
accepted the plan to close the century-old enterprise, protests escalated violently, to
the point of a day-long urban guerrilla fight against the police. Over 500 were
arrested, about eighty injured, and a number of public buildings throughout the
city were damaged.62
Between 20 and 22 June 1968, workers’ protests broke out again, in a further
attempt to save the Trieste shipyard. The workers erected barricades and again
fought the police. This time, about 135 were arrested, and about fifty policemen
and 16 civilians were injured.63 A year later, in the course of the ‘hot autumn’ of
1969, the workers at the San Marco shipyard again occupied the docks.64
There was thus an apparent choreography of public labour violence in the
border region, in 1966, 1968 and 1969 in Trieste and in 1970 in Koper. One may
add that in 1969 and 1971 there were also massive and violent strikes in the nearby
city of Rijeka (It. Fiume), in Croatia.65 A direct influence of Italian public riots on
events in Yugoslavia seems plausible. An entangled investigation of the communi-
cation between analogous industries on both sides of this comparatively open Cold
War border might produce an illustration of what Charles S. Maier and others
have hypothesized to be a ‘crisis of industrialization’ that affected both capitalist
and state socialist societies, and cannot be properly understood if exploration is
limited to only one of the two economic and political systems.66
How to Contain Workers’ Dissatisfaction?
Considered from a strictly Yugoslav perspective, the strike in Koper was one of a
large number of work stoppages that had marked Yugoslavia’s self-management
system since the end of the 1950s. Between January 1958 and September 1969,
more than 1,500 work stoppages had occurred, most of them in Yugoslavia’s
most prosperous republics, Slovenia and Croatia. There was no need for any
Western-incited political apprenticeship, it seems. Whilst the central position of
the working class in communist ideology and the cult of labour implied that work-
ers’ strikes deserved a special, gentler treatment by the authorities than protests by
other groups, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) claimed that strikes
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were superfluous in a workers’ self-management system. Yet, strikes occurred more
frequently in Yugoslavia than in any other East European socialist state. As was
the case in Koper, strikes were generally short because the authorities dealt quickly
with the workers’ demands, largely by satisfying them. The strikes’ organizers were
often targeted, but repression, if it occurred at all, was highly selective, and more
often than not it was the managers who were the accused parties.67 In Koper, it
seems that a group of ‘conspirators’ who knew the procedure used it skilfully to
achieve their own ambitions.
As elsewhere, disagreements on the shop floor in Titoist Yugoslavia continu-
ously brought potential conflict into everyday working life, especially when it came
to salary arrangements, the immediate cause of the 1970 strike in Koper. To be
sure, the quantity of strikes and work stoppages cannot be interpreted as a per se
threat to the system. Their frequency, however, reveals discontent among the work-
force. In contrast, outbursts of public violence on the shop floor, as happened in
Koper in 1970, were rare. The manifest need for a reassessment of the social con-
tract in the face of a considerable amount of local protest led to an open discussion
among industrial sociologists and social engineers of the Yugoslav self-manage-
ment system about how to contain social conflict. The aim was to incorporate
strikes into the system as legitimate events, forming part of the contemplated par-
ticipation of workers in the enterprise.68
Two years after the 1974 Constitution, an intricate regulatory piece amounting
to one of the longest constitutions in the world, the Law on Associated Labour
(Zakon o udruženom radu) was introduced in November 1976. The Law was also
called the ‘little constitution’ because it added another 600 articles to the 1974
Constitution. It transformed the autonomy of enterprises with respect to the
state, and it minutely defined workers’ participation in the management of enter-
prises in an attempt to codify entirely the relations between management and
workers. Each Yugoslav worker would belong to a Basic Organization of
Associated Labour (BOAL) based on the precise role played by the worker in
the production process. The expectation was that the state would gradually with-
draw from intervention in the economy, leaving market forces to operate within a
framework regulated by the decisions of the organizations of associated labour.
This idea, however, proved unrealistic.69
Whilst the workers’ councils may have represented, at least ideologically, a well-
meant attempt to put management tasks in the hands of the workers, all political
power continued to be monopolized by the Party, which controlled the recruitment
of the administrative personnel.70 In view of the attempts to put a firm lid on self-
managed labour relations, those rare moments when violence erupted made the
‘seismograph of social change’ register a considerable tremor.71 Strikes, especially
when carried out fiercely enough to erupt in violence, defined the border between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour more clearly in an authoritarian society like
Yugoslavia than in a liberal democratic society. In Yugoslavia, reactions to such
incidents remained procedural, in line with the mentioned ‘legitimation’ of work
stoppages, ensuring ever-increasing measures of control, decentralization and
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ultimately fragmentation of labour relations, through a futile attempt to match and
control ideology and practice.72
In Koper, the prospect of (and possibly the demand for) wage increases was
sacrificed to huge investments. Director Petrinja deemed the railway connection to
the hinterland an indispensable priority. His rhetoric of the ‘heroes of labour’ was
marked by the expectation that these ‘heroes’ would understand the necessities and
would sacrifice their workforce to this goal. The result was a discursive division
between ‘good workers’ and ‘layabouts’, as well as an attempt to construct a locally
rooted loyalty, a borderland loyalty, by denouncing as ‘layabouts’ precisely those
workers who had come from parts of Yugoslavia beyond the immediate Istrian
hinterland. It was they who were accused of having brought social tensions into the
enterprise. Given that Istria had been emptied of labour capacities, largely ethnic
Italians but also Slovenes and Croats, by the massive emigration of its inhabitants
to Italy and elsewhere, such discursive inner-Yugoslav divisions had implications
that require further scrutiny.73
Conclusion
This study suggests that ‘a stronger micro-historical inspection of Yugoslav social-
ism’ will indeed reveal ‘considerable local difference in the actual grasp of authority
on society’.74 In the late 1980s, contemporary Yugoslav socioeconomic analysts
were clearly aware of the looming socio-political earthquakes, as Sergej Kraigher
wrote in 1987 in the foreword to a volume on ‘the self-managed practice of
common interests in the SFRJ’:75
Work stoppages and strikes and other expressions of dissatisfaction reveal that the
working people and citizens are ever-less content with the fact that the crisis and its
consequences and other problems vital for their lives and future are solved above their
heads.
Kraigher denounced the overwhelming urge of the state organs to control social
practices. He had inherited the functions of the ‘father’ of self-management,
Edvard Kardelj, after the latter’s death in 1979, and had led an expert commission
that was to prepare recommendations for economic recovery. The recommenda-
tions were expressed along free market lines, but once more without basically
questioning self-management practices. Such proposals met with little response.
There has been a lack of historiographic investigation into attempts to reform
and refine the mechanisms of social control, meaning attempts to contain violence
discursively and practically. At the same time, the suggested longue durée linkages
between the late 1960s/early 1970s and the late 1980s call for further investigation.
The example of Koper indicates, almost paradoxically, that a charismatic per-
sonality in the top management position was needed to steer a company success-
fully through the sea of self-managed technocracy and codified relational
prescriptions. The director of the port of Koper, Danilo Petrinja, seems to have
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acted, or tried to act, with a free market rationale from the beginning, possibly
relying on the ideology that viewed workers as systemic heroes whilst at the same
time exercising authoritarian social control. When this approach failed, his career
as director and main initiator of the local industrial growth ended. The 1970 strike
was to remain the only significant violent public labour conflict in the Koper port
until the breakup of Yugoslavia. Given the symbolic significance of the port as part
of Yugoslavia’s north-western borderland and as one of the major modernizing
projects in Slovenia, its relative economic success in the crisis-ridden 1980s, again
under a charismatic director, seems to support the conclusion that Slovenia offered
a special story in socialist Yugoslavia (and afterwards).76
In all societies, regardless of the political system, social control offers a valuable
key to understanding violence, conflict and issues related to the formation and
acceptance of social norms. As Pieter Spierenburg has pointed out, control is
always a ‘sensitizing concept’: it draws attention to the relationships between vari-
ous mechanisms that are designed to make people act in a way that is desirable
according to a certain standard or ideal.77 In Yugoslavia, the imperative to contain
both social and national conflict, to declare the former ideologically non-existent
and the latter resolved, made social relationships in the workplace one of the cen-
tral loci of the Titoist socialist system and shaped the ways in which control and
mediating mechanisms functioned or failed.
Branka Magaš has pointed out that a change in political semantics in Slovenia
and Croatia preceded the change in the system, transforming ‘comrades’ into ‘citi-
zens’ long before the end of state socialism.78 Inherent in the present case study,
with Trieste serving to permit a brief glimpse into the workings of an analogous
industry in a democratic political system barely 20 kilometres away, are more
substantial questions about the genesis of repertoires of action in modern social
conflict. Lastly, the tensions within workers’ milieus, placed in their respective
contexts, bring into question the value of viewing the Cold War as a bipolar
divide, with the repercussions that this interpretation continues to have for the
scholarly imagination.79
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5. Winfried Süß and Dietmar Süß, ‘Zeitgeschichte der Arbeit: Beobachtungen und
Perspektiven’, in Knud Andresen, Ursula Bitzegeio and Jürgen Mittag, eds, ‘Nach
dem Strukturbruch’? Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitsbeziehungen und
Arbeitswelt(en) seit den 1970er Jahren (Bonn 2011), 345–65, 349.
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director Mako Sajko, Kje je železna zavesa? (Ljubljana 1961), available on YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLElxTOuep4.
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enterprise that remained relatively untouched by the economic disaster of the 1980s.
In the food combineAgrokomercin Bosnia, the close cooperation of the managers,
Bosnian politicians and the Yugoslav People’s Army, which was deeply involved in
the company’s economy, as wel as corrupt and ilegal financial dealings, helped steer
the company through every crisis. In the end, clientelism and corruption led to concerted
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